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The quest for inﬂuence: Examining Russia’s public diplomacy
mechanisms in Africa
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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

This article examines Russian public diplomacy mechanisms in
Africa. These include the intentional use of historical ties, various
aid programmes in education and health, the targeted use of
international broadcasting and digital media, and the exploitation
of anti-Western sentiments on the continent. Russia employs
these to win the hearts and minds of African publics for its
national interest. The article ﬁrst explores Moscow’s public
diplomacy in general and analyses the challenges Russia faces in
Africa, which has become a ‘dumping ground’ for public
diplomacy campaigns by the US, the EU and its members, the UK,
and China. The article argues that Russia’s public diplomacy in
Africa is state-centric with little or no civil society involvement.
This makes its message appear incredible. The article concludes
that Russian public diplomacy eﬀorts in Africa have intensiﬁed
anti-Western sentiments in African countries where Moscow’s
presence is strong.
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Introduction
The quest for inﬂuence that Joseph Nye in 19901 termed soft power – ‘understood as the
ability to inﬂuence others by attraction rather than by coercion or payment’ – is in fact an
old phenomenon in international relations and diplomacy. The desire by countries to
extend their inﬂuence in other parts of the globe has propelled many nations to adopt
diﬀerent strategies in line with their foreign policy objectives. Generally, since the
Second World War, the contest has been between the established democracies of the
‘West’ and the emerging powers of what will be called here the ‘East’ – that is, Russia
and China. Africa has been one of the most keenly contested grounds for this competitive
public diplomacy.
Historically, the West and East have competed over Africa since its struggle for independence during the Cold War era, oﬀering diﬀerent political ideologies and copious
amounts of foreign aid. After the Cold War, Russia withdrew from the public diplomacy
competition in winning African governments and their citizens, ceding that eﬀort to its
competitors like the US and its allies. As a result, the continent was not one of
Moscow’s foreign policy priorities during the 1990s.2 Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian
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Deputy Foreign Aﬀairs Minister, aﬃrms that there was a certain pause in Russian-African
ties due to Moscow’s domestic problems after the collapse of the Soviet Union, noting
that Russia pushed Africa into the background while closing most of its embassies on
the continent.3 He believes that Moscow lost much over this period of its absence in
Africa because ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ and the West, China, Turkey, and India ﬁlled it
after Russia ‘retreated’ from Africa.4
However, since the 2000s, the Kremlin5 has rejuvenated its quest for inﬂuence on the
African continent through military and economic activities, supplementing these with
public diplomacy through a variety of mechanisms. Russian aims have been clearly
expressed by Bogdanov, who claims, ‘Africa is beyond any doubt the continent of the
future, both from the point of view of human resources and because it is a storeroom
of the world, one of the richest regions’.6
In this article, it is argued that Moscow has initiated campaigns to attract the favour of
African publics, apart from directly engaging with African governments through traditional diplomacy. Remarkably, the Western media seems to have under-reported the
growing inﬂuence of Moscow in many African countries, instead concentrating on
Russia’s activities in Europe and Asia. However, while Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24
February 2022 resulted in widespread condemnation of the country in the West, many
African governments demonstrated a reluctance to join the international community
by condemning the Kremlin openly. This, it appears, has generated new attention regarding Russia’s inﬂuence in Africa.
This article aims to critically analyse the major Russian public diplomacy tools
employed in its eﬀorts toward Africa. Although Moscow relies heavily on military and
economic power in its ‘second coming’ to Africa to achieve foreign policy goals, this
study concentrates on Russia’s foreign engagement with African audiences to wield
soft power. The motivation arises from the view that to ignore Moscow’s public diplomacy
ability provides an imbalanced analysis of its power strategy in Africa. The article examines Russian public diplomacy mechanisms through the lens of Golan’s integrated
public diplomacy model.7 This model provides a framework for this study. Each mechanism is analysed based on Golan’s three integrated public diplomacy model levels while
assessing its impact and weakness concerning soft power.
The article argues that Russia’s public diplomacy in Africa is state-centric and ‘hierarchical’. Moscow’s public diplomacy mechanisms are engineered heavily, both directly and
indirectly, by the state. The Russian government is the sole actor with its state-aﬃliated
and controlled agencies, arguably making its message look incredible; it is widely recognised that government-generated messages are generally perceived as propaganda.8 The
study also hypothesises that Russian public diplomacy campaigns in Africa have intensiﬁed anti-Western sentiments among African publics, in Moscow’s favour. It should be
noted that scholars from diverse disciplines have tackled the discussion of Russia’s
inﬂuence in Africa; however, the literature on the debate from the public diplomacy
angle is sparse. Thus, this article attempts to ﬁll this lacuna and balance the academic
narrative.
The article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the methodology for
the study is outlined. The next section deals with the general practice of Russian public
diplomacy, and then the article explores Russian public diplomacy in Africa. Moscow’s
ﬁve public diplomacy mechanisms are considered, across the three levels of integrated
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public diplomacy as practised by Russia in Africa. Next is an analysis of challenges faced by
Russia as it employs these mechanisms on the continent, and then an examination of the
implications of Moscow’s public diplomacy in Africa. The ﬁnal section concludes the
article with the author’s observations about the Kremlin’s public diplomacy campaigns
in Africa.

Methodology
The article is based on a qualitative review of scholarship relating to the topic under discussion. The author adopted a stratiﬁed random sample on Russia’s public diplomacy
mechanisms in Africa and applied content analysis to the data. The research covered a
three month period, March through May 2022. Within this period, the Kremlin’s soft
power and public diplomacy campaign activities in Africa, discussed in the academic literature and reported in both the traditional and digital media, were researched using
search engines like Google, Twitter and Facebook. The article is thus a research article
relying on secondary sources. The case study method is chosen with a focus on Russia
among the numerous other actors conducting public diplomacy campaigns in Africa.9

Russian public diplomacy at a glance
Deﬁning public diplomacy continues to vex scholars; what it is precisely has not been
agreed upon in half a century, and nuances prohibit a universal view. However, Tuch’s
deﬁnition is among the most cited in public diplomacy scholarship, deﬁning the
concept as a ‘government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an
attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions
and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies’.10 The defect of this
deﬁnition, it is now recognised, is the absence of non-state actors, which are key components in the ‘new public diplomacy’; traditional diplomacy is government-to-government, top-down and one-way communication, but the ‘new public diplomacy’ entails
both government to public and public-to-public communications (citizen diplomacy),
in a two-way and decentralised manner.11 The ‘new public diplomacy’ thus includes
non-state actors such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), supranational organisations, and others, often employing modern digital communication tools like social media.12 For the purposes of this article, public diplomacy
is deﬁned as strategic foreign communication directed towards targeted foreign
publics by a state or non-state actor to inﬂuence public opinion about the originating
country.
In order to grasp the true import of Moscow’s public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa,
it is vital to understand its general approach to public diplomacy. Russian public diplomacy practice has been in existence since before the beginning of the 21st century.13
In fact, from the early 1920s until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Russia, as part of
the Soviet Union, enthusiastically embraced the practice of public diplomacy to spread
Soviet ideology, although US retired diplomat Edmond Gullion coined the term only in
1965.14 However, the concept took on new signiﬁcance during the Cold War, when the
two superpowers were engaged in a confrontation involving competing ideologies. For
each, the sharing of information via public diplomacy was centre stage. This phenomenon
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led the US to establish the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953,15 while the
Soviet Union also intensiﬁed its propaganda apparatus. Thus, it can be argued that both
superpowers’ public diplomacy mechanisms were employed to purvey propaganda
during the Cold War.
After the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia
seemed to withdraw from traditional public diplomacy activities.16 In general, the
country appeared to experience an identity crisis on the global stage. When in 2003,
the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin conducted a poll in the US asking
people about what they associated with Russia,17 the result was not what the Kremlin
had expected; the country was associated with communism, propaganda, the KGB
(Russian intelligence service), snow and the maﬁa, among other terms.18 Due to these
unfavourable responses, Russia implemented measures to reform its public image,
employing public diplomacy in its diplomatic toolkit. Putin in eﬀect restructured the
country’s public diplomacy.
In Russia, there has been ongoing discussion regarding soft power and public diplomacy, how the two concepts relate and how to develop them to achieve the country’s
foreign policy goals.19 One main factor that motivates the Kremlin to enhance its
public diplomacy potential is the drive to improve global perceptions of Russia.20
Russia’s public diplomacy has two main narratives, according to Anna Velikaya, a highly
regarded Russian academic. The ﬁrst narrative is based on Russia being the protector
of the ‘free world’, by countering the imposition of Western-style democracy and the
removal of sovereign governments, also by the West, and the second narrative is based
on Russia protecting traditional family values.21 Many non-Western countries, especially
in Africa, welcome these two narratives as convincing.22
It is clear that at this point in history, the Russian conception of soft power is based
generally on that of President Putin. The Russian president deﬁnes the concept as ‘promoting one’s interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception
of one’s country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and
intellectual heritage’.23 The Kremlin develops its public diplomacy and thus accumulates
soft power currency through mass communication in its engagement of foreign publics to
explain Russian international policy.24
This is mostly accomplished through oﬃcial channels, although Russia also incorporates NGOs into its public diplomacy strategy to consolidate its soft power campaigns.
As early as 2012, Putin signed the Measures to Implement the Foreign Policy Course of
the Russian Federation, which enshrined the role of civil society, including NGOs, in
Russia’s foreign policy.25 As a result, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MFA) has
established and maintains relations with the country’s NGOs.26 Greg Simons asserts
that Russia’s MFA held over 250 events within its framework of NGO interactions in
2012, and the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States,
Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, commonly
referred to as the Rossotrudnichestvo, has relations with about 150 NGOs.27 In Russia,
about 5000 oﬃcially registered NGOs are involved in the Kremlin’s foreign policy, and
859 out of this number possess international status.28 These NGOs include the Positive
Russia Foundation, the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, the Historical Memory
Foundation, and the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation.29 The Gorchakov Foundation is the most active Russian NGO under the MFA, actively presenting the
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country’s culture and image to foreign publics.30 These NGOs aim to build relationships
with diverse foreign publics for the Kremlin to achieve its foreign policy.31 Many of
these NGOs, according to Simons, use advocacy, information management, strategic communications and other mechanisms to engage foreign audiences through public events
and networking.32 It is interesting to note that many of these Russian NGOs focus on the
European and American publics, while few focus on Africa. At the same time, it is likely
that the independence of these NGOs is questioned since foreign publics in the US and
Europe perceive them as directly or indirectly working for the Kremlin.33
Indeed, since 2000 Moscow has created many institutions to spearhead its public diplomacy campaign in its eﬀorts to reposition the country on the global stage as a signiﬁcant
international player. Institutions such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation were established in
2007 to promote the teaching of the Russian language abroad.34 In 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo was also founded to promote the dissemination of a new and modern Russia.35
The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was established in 2010 to intensify and
promote the global activities of Russian NGOs and national institutions. In 2011 the
Russian International Aﬀairs Council (RIAC) was founded as a non-proﬁt academic and
diplomatic think tank to link the country and the international academic community
while making inputs on foreign policy.36 Even earlier, in 2005 Moscow established its
international broadcasting television channel, Russia Today (RT), to promote the country’s
international image on the global stage. With their co-ordinated social media eﬀorts, RT
and Sputnik, another state-sponsored media outlet, have been powerful Russian public
diplomacy mechanisms – especially in Africa where both networks are very actively followed.37 Russia also established a new Intergovernmental Commission on Development
Aid in November 2020.38 Thus Moscow’s public diplomacy presently involves an array of
government-sponsored cultural, health, educational, military, sports, foreign aid, and
international broadcasting entities, coupled with digital public diplomacy.39
It is worth stating that the country’s current public diplomacy approach is based on its
recently reformed Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) of the Russian Federation. This document
is indicative of the pragmatic foreign policy of the modern Russian state as compared to
the ideological approach taken during the Soviet era.40 The FPC was initially published in
2000 and then, after revisions in 2008, 2013 and 2016, appeared in its current form.41 It
aﬃrms that:42
Russia seeks to ensure that the world has an objective image of the country, develops its own
eﬀective ways to inﬂuence foreign audiences, promotes Russian and Russian-language media
in the global information space.

The FPC does not give much space to discussing Africa as compared to Asia; only one
article (Article 99) is dedicated to Moscow’s relations with Africa, stating Russia’s intention
to expand its interactions with African countries in a multidimensional approach. The FPC
nonetheless provides some guidance on the state’s approach and model of public diplomacy generally, and is thus pertinent for this discussion.
Some scholars such as Natalia Tsvetkova and Dmitry Rushchin argue that although
Russia’s public diplomacy has gone through reforms with substantial ﬁnancial support
from the government, foreign aid alone cannot help Russia’s public diplomacy to win
the hearts and minds of its targeted publics nor enhance its nation-branding agenda.43
Others criticise the Kremlin’s public diplomacy model for the lack of substantive
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involvement from non-state actors in its message delivery to foreign publics, although as
earlier noted the MFA would claim otherwise.44 According to critics, however, Moscow’s
approach is state-based and top-down, lacking civil society engagement in other
countries.45 According to Velikaya, Russian civil society does not get widely involved in
the state’s public diplomacy campaigns compared with the West because of a lack of recognition of the importance of civil society engagement in nation-branding eﬀorts.46 This
weakness, unfortunately, put Russia’s messaging credibility into doubt since foreign
publics are cynical about top-down government-controlled narratives.47 These defects
in Moscow’s public diplomacy are also present in its African public diplomacy strategy,
it is here argued. The mechanisms of Russian engagement in Africa comprise the focus
of the next section of the article.

Russian public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa
Several mechanisms for inﬂuencing foreign publics are at play in Russian public diplomacy in Africa. These include the intentional use of historical ties, various aid programmes
in education and health, the targeted use of international broadcasting and digital media,
and the exploitation of anti-Western sentiments on the continent. These will be considered in turn below before discussing the challenges these eﬀorts face on the continent.

Historical ties
Historical ties serve as one of the leading Russian public diplomacy tools in its current reengagement with Africa. The Kremlin repeatedly harkens back to its Cold War foreign aid
assistance oﬀered to most African states in its current quest for inﬂuence. Understanding
these historical links helps one grasp the aﬃnity many African states have for Russia
today, despite the international opprobrium aimed at Moscow over its conﬂict in Ukraine.
Ali Mazrui argues that in Africa’s history over the last 50 years (since the 1970s), there
has been a transition from the inﬂuence of Western ideas to the inﬂuence of other
examples from the Global South, including Russia.48 During the Cold War, Russia’s
public diplomacy toward Africa aimed to spread communist ideology to the newly independent states on the continent, in contrast to the West’s ideology of liberal democracy.
Because many African states attained independence during the Cold War era, this battle of
ideas had implications for these new states’ international relations. The Soviet Union,
under the leadership of Nikita Khrushcev, saw an opportunity to gain more allies in
Africa and thwart perceived US imperialist ambitions on the continent. The US, on the
other hand, saw the end of colonial rule in African states as an opportunity to access
new markets and prevent the spread of communism.49 During the Cold War, it could be
argued that the Soviet Union was a decade ahead of its main competitor, the US, in
terms of understanding the forces at work in these newly independent countries. In any
case, both superpowers extended economic aid to African countries during the Cold
War in order to build stronger ties and woo the respective states over to their side in
the standoﬀ between communism and liberal capitalist democracy. Then, as today,
foreign aid came with both overt and covert motives serving the donors’ national interests.
While Russian oﬃcial foreign aid programmes in Africa during the Cold War were far
smaller than those of the West, its support of African liberation movements was far
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greater.50 The West was reluctant to support many African liberation movements, who
were often perceived as leaning socialist (although some Western private entities did
support them).51 In the main, the Soviets and their allies were seen as strong champions
of African liberation movements, especially in Southern Africa, providing ﬁnancial as well
as material support. For instance, the Soviet Union provided substantial economic and
military aid to radical regimes in Ghana, Mali and Guinea, among others. This aid included
training facilities for the liberation soldiers, and military consultants and instructors to
impart skills in guerrilla warfare and jungle strategy.52
Indeed the legacy of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s inﬂuence in Africa are likely
to contribute to shaping African publics’ perceptions and aﬃnity toward Russia in its
current re-engagement with the continent. Egypt, for example, beneﬁted heavily from
the Soviet Union’s foreign aid, which helped ﬁnance the building of the Aswan High
Dam in the 1960s.53 The dam is one of the most enduring monuments of Moscow’s aid
to Egypt, from the period of the leadership of Abdel Nasser. The Soviet Union also supplied Egypt’s freedom ﬁghters with weapons and other aid, while many Egyptians had
opportunities to study at Soviet universities and military schools through Soviet scholarships.54 Since that period, Moscow has had a strong relationship with Egypt. Today, under
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt is an ally of Russia, a fact that is generally wellreceived among the Egyptian public.55
Mali also beneﬁted from Soviet economic and military assistance under its ﬁrst postindependence president, Modibo Keita. Russia’s welcome in the country has been positive, particularly under the current Malian military junta.56 The junta increasingly
depends on Moscow for military support as its relations with the West deteriorate.
Russian assistance was received positively by the Malian public, with news footage
showing crowds in jubilation during the military coup, holding Russian ﬂags high and
singing in appreciation to Moscow.57 Clearly historical ties impact Moscow’s current
public diplomacy narrative on the continent. It has intentionally built upon these historical connections to court African publics. Moscow recently reminded South Africans, for
instance, of the role it played in the ﬁght against apartheid.58
As in the time of the Soviet Union, Russian public diplomacy remains state-centric. This
shows that the Kremlin has not materially changed its public diplomacy playbook in Africa
apart from dropping its communist ideology. Still, this history has played a signiﬁcant role
in Russia’s quest for inﬂuence in Africa, it would appear. The historical link between the
Kremlin and Africa serves as a bridge for Russia to quickly reconnect with its past allies
on the continent.

Educational aid
Educational aid is another public diplomacy mechanism adopted by the Kremlin to woo
African governments and their people. It is one of the relational approaches in integrated
public diplomacy, helping states to build long-term relationships and ties with foreign
publics. In most Western public diplomacy programmes, education plays a signiﬁcant
role in inﬂuencing foreign public opinion. For instance, the US has a Fulbright education
programme for international students. In addition, education exchange programmes in
public diplomacy help shape the perception of the international students who beneﬁt
from these programmes. Recognising the signiﬁcant role played by education in the
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quest for soft power or inﬂuence, Russia under Putin has established a series of Russian
Cultural Centres in many African countries since the 2000s, with education as its
topmost priority in these cultural centres.59
Historically, during the Cold War era, the Soviet Union gave African students scholarships to study in Russia and other communist states. Some of the students who
studied in Russia returned home to take up leadership roles in their own country, and
reports show that their experiences in Russia created ties with that culture and country
which endure.60 It is estimated that about 45 075 sub-Saharan Africans from Ghana,
Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia and others obtained their education
in Soviet universities, while 17 895 more were still studying when it collapsed.61 A
report from Oxfam indicates that over 100 000 African students might have been educated in Soviet states overall by 1989, with funds from the Soviet Scholarship
scheme.62 Ethiopia was the largest recipient of Soviet scholarships, with over 8 000 scholarship recipients; Nigeria followed next with more than 5 000. Other states with a large
number of recipients include Ghana, Tanzania, and Madagascar.63 This approach may
inﬂuence students’ worldviews and political sympathies with Moscow. In its Africa reengagement agenda, Russia continues to follow its old Soviet educational strategy
through a series of educational and cultural exchange programmes. At present, it is estimated that about 27 000 African students are pursuing diﬀerent educational programmes
at various Russian higher institutions.64 These students are from African countries such as
Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Morocco and Namibia. This mechanism’s impact is so signiﬁcant
that CAR announced the introduction of mandatory Russian language learning for students in tertiary institutions in that country from 2022.65
Since the 2000s, Russia’s MFA and Ministry of Education have put in place measures to
increase quotas and scholarships assigned to African students, mainly from English and
Portuguese speaking states such as Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Angola and
Mozambique.66 The joint eﬀorts of these two ministries has proved successful; in 2010,
African students in Russia were estimated to be 6 700, and by 2018 that number had
increased to 15 000, an increase of 130%.67 While this number demonstrates a steady
growth, it is however small relative to students on scholarships from other regions. The
number of international students studying in Russia during the same period in 2018
from Kazakhstan was 71 000; Ukraine 23 000; and from China 27 000.68 African students
embrace these scholarship programmes due to the dearth of opportunities at home for tertiary education, making the impact – though not immediately evident – likely to bear fruit in
the long term for perceptions of Russia, based on past programme indicators.69
To deepen Russian educational ties with the African continent, the Kremlin’s ‘Study in
Russia’ campaign is also actively promoting scholarship opportunities for African students
on both traditional and social media platforms in diﬀerent African states such as Kenya,
Ghana, Ethiopia and Morocco, and was designed to woo students to join its higher education institutions for the 2022 academic intake.70 It is reported that in the 2020/2021 academic year, over 27 000 African students studied at the Kremlin’s higher education
institutions, an increase of fourfold since 2010/2011.71 Of the 27 000 African students,
Morrocco leads with about 3 200 students admitted, followed by Nigeria (900), Kenya
(700), Zambia (450) and Cameroon (200), respectively.72 Russia’s educational public diplomacy in Africa pales in comparison with that of the West, however; there were over 48 000
African students studying at institutions in the US in the same period.73
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Health aid
The Kremlin’s global health engagement has been in existence since the Soviet Union era.
Moscow is aware that playing an active role in global health will bring beneﬁts directly or
indirectly regarding improving its foreign perception and image. Generally, as part of
public diplomacy, health assistance has been one of the long-term relational approaches
in courting foreign countries’ governments and citizens.74 Hence, almost all the major
powers competing for inﬂuence in Africa have health as a strategic approach in their outreach programmes.75
During the Soviet era, Russia oﬀered scholarships to African medical students. Thus,
many African medical doctors had their training in Russia and its satellite states. African
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Angola and Zaire beneﬁted from this health aid mechanism.76 Medical training oﬀered by the Soviet regime helped partly alleviate some of the
health issues on the continent, as did the Soviet medical personnel sent to oﬀer their services in African countries.77 However, this health assistance decreased with the Soviet
Union’s collapse and a lengthy period of economic transition.
With Russia’s re-engagement in Africa, the Kremlin has revived its health diplomacy
eﬀorts on the continent, albeit not at the same level as in the Soviet epoch. For instance,
during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Africa, the Kremlin, through the World Health Organisation, donated items worth $38 000 to Sierra Leone in response to the outbreak.78 Of all
the degree programmes oﬀered by Moscow to international students, medicine remains
one of the most popular for international students. For example, in 2010/11, medical students represented 18% of international students in Russia.79
Moscow also attempted to take advantage of its ability to develop a COVID-19 vaccine
to enhance its African health aid mechanism, through what has been termed ‘vaccine
diplomacy’. This new concept uses vaccines to wield inﬂuence or soft power in other
countries or regions by the donating country. Because of the West’s ‘vaccine nationalism’
(hoarding of vaccines from manufacturers to vaccinate one’s citizens as soon as possible
regardless of the ratio of distribution to the rest of the world), many African countries
ordered the Russian Sputnik vaccines as the extent of the pandemic and the dearth of vaccines available on the continent became evident.
In February 2021, the African Union (AU) vaccine task team conﬁrmed that Moscow
had oﬀered the continent 300 million doses of its Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccines.80 This
oﬀer came with a ﬁnancial package for African states that wanted to acquire its vaccines.
However, several problems arose, including failure of Sputnik V to be approved by the
South African health authorities, which cast questions over Moscow’s vaccine supply. In
the end, Russia could not deliver the vaccine oﬀer as contracted to the AU as Moscow
faced the challenge of supply with the high demand of the vaccine.81 So, while the
attempt at COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy by the Kremlin may be an indicator of
Moscow’s quest for inﬂuence on the continent, the jury is out on whether this was an
eﬀective public diplomacy eﬀort in the end.

International broadcasting and digital diplomacy
International broadcasting has been a crucial element in states’ public diplomacy from the
period of the First and Second World Wars through the Cold War, and continues although
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often in diﬀerent formats in the present age of digital diplomacy. The West and East have
adopted this strategy in their global public engagement campaigns. The main reason for
the signiﬁcance of international broadcasting in public diplomacy programmes is that, as
supported by many previous studies, most foreign publics get their information about
any country from the mass media, both traditional and digital, and now especially via
social media platforms.82 As a result, many countries have a massive budget to boost
their international broadcasting channels. For instance, Germany has the DW; the UK
has the BBC; France has France24; the US has CNN and VOA; China has CCGNT; the
Arab world has Al-Jazeera, while Russia has RT and Sputnik.83 Conversely, not one
African country has its own international broadcasting channel.84
Generally, global media outlets and social media platforms such as Twitter have
become an important means of shaping foreign publics’ perceptions of a foreign
nation.85 Russia has intensiﬁed its international broadcasting and digital diplomacy on
the African continent precisely because it is aware that obtaining favourable foreign
media coverage is a prerequisite for successful public diplomacy campaigns.86 As long
as international media coverage is unfavourable to a country, it is not easy to obtain credibility with the targeted foreign audiences necessary for successful relationship-building,
and that credibility is essential in the quest for soft power, argues Nye.87
RT and Sputnik remain the primary Russian international broadcasting channels. These
are state-sponsored media networks, based in Moscow with extended branches in other
parts of the globe, including the UK and the US. They broadcast in foreign languages such
as English, Spanish, Arabic and French, spreading the Russian view on developments in
the world on a daily basis. The US and other Western states have heavily criticised
these networks for being purveyors of Russian propaganda, sometimes with malicious
intent, but Moscow has denied these allegations several times.88 Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the networks were banned in Europe and the US.89 Due to this
embargo, the Kremlin announced plans to establish its RT regional headquarters in
South Africa.90
Russia is aware that one of the central means of courting African publics is through the
media. Thus, it has strengthened its media relations with the African continent, initiating
media-related programmes to train African media personnel, especially state media.91 In
line with this, Russia’s MFA, Ministry of communications, Diplomatic Academy and Institute for African Studies organised a short training workshop for senior editors working
in African state media organisations in 2018.92 The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa) media summit held in July 2018 also highlighted the importance of
media co-operation between BRICS countries and Africa.93
A 2018 report on the impact of Russian-funded media on African publics, commissioned by the French Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Defence, showed that the French
language version of RT had attracted a great number of subscribers in the sub-Saharan
African states of the Maghreb region.94 Additionally, some online African news websites
rely heavily on Russian channels for their news content; for instance, it was detected in the
report that one of the most visited websites in Senegal, seneweb.com, with over 1.5
million Facebook subscribers, picked up most of Sputnik’s articles on Africa.95
The embargo placed on Russian news channels following the invasion of Ukraine,
restricting broadcasting in the EU and the US since 2nd March 2022, has seen Moscow
expanding its media presence in Africa, especially in the francophone states.96 The
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Kremlin’s interest in the French-speaking states in Africa is justiﬁable; about 60% of the
300 million French speakers in the world today live in Africa, according to the president
of RT France, Xenia Federova.97 Even before the embargo, as of January 2022, the RT
channel had registered many internet domain names like ‘Rt-afrique.com’, Africart.com, ‘Rtafrica.media’, and ‘RtAfrique.online’.98 This move depicts Russia’s ambition to
use media to engage the French African publics. For instance, the Kremlin channel has
intensiﬁed its visibility in the North and East of Africa by having a regional correspondent
in Tunis and Nairobi. The latter city was where RT initially aimed to establish its African
headquarters for the English-language bureau. Instead, for undisclosed reasons,
Moscow has moved it to South Africa.99 Regarding setting its RT Africa hub in South
Africa, the spokesperson for RT said ‘we are indeed currently focused on developing
our English-language Africa hub in South Africa, headed up by Paula Slier – a South
Africa native, RT’s long time correspondent and formerly head of RT’s Jerusalem
bureau’.100 It is claimed that the reason may be to avoid direct competition with China,
which has already established its CGTN hub in Nairobi.101
Russian media in Africa also launched its ‘Africonnect’ programme.102 Its main goal is to
present African news from the Kremlin’s perspective, thus broadening its African audience. Russian Sputnik Radio has been operating for years from Ouagadougou, Burkina
Faso, while RT is broadcasting in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon.103 It is believed
that the listenership of Sputnik Burkina Faso is the fourth largest audience of Sputnik
France, after the audiences in France, Belgium and Canada.104 This shows the capacity
of Russian media to ﬂourish on the continent, especially in the francophone region of
Africa. Although the audience share is yet to make any breakthrough to large numbers
in these African countries where Russian media outlets are operating, establishing an
RT Africa may shift the audience share in Russian media’s favour, according to some
researchers like Maxine Audient, citing the success of Sputnik in Burkina Faso as an
example.105 Without doubt, the increasing presence of Russian media in its public diplomacy campaigns in Africa demonstrates that this is one of the mechanisms of Moscow’s
soft power strategy on the continent.

Exploiting anti-Western sentiments
Although the ideological elements of its past incarnations are missing in Russia’s ‘second
coming’ to Africa, Moscow still capitalises on the anti-Western narrative to win the hearts
and minds of African publics and their governments.106 In this aspect, Russia’s foreign
media channels like RT and Sputnik, with their managed social media platforms, are
the primary instrument used to propagate this public diplomacy message.107 For
example, these Russian media outlets often portray Moscow as ‘friendly’, aiming to
bring prosperity to Africa and attacking Western states for still engaging in imperialistic
behaviour in their former colonies.108 The extreme anti-Western narrative propagated
by Russia on the continent has caused concern for France; Paris has expressed worries
about the expansion of the Kremlin’s anti-Western propaganda in Africa, with
Moscow’s RT and Sputnik promoting an anti-French political narrative to undermine
France’s credibility and weaken historical relations with its former African colonies like
Mali, CAR and others.109 According to a BBC report by Hugh Schoﬁeld, this antiWestern rhetoric contributed to the French decision to withdraw its troops from Mali
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earlier in 2022, although the withdrawal decision was more complex than simply a
response to anti-Western narratives, it must be noted.110
In its anti-Western rhetoric, the Kremlin has successfully portrayed itself as the defender against Western neo-colonialism and imperialism, pointing to the West’s historical and
present crimes against African sovereignty.111 Russia has framed itself, in its public diplomacy message in Africa, as a supporter of multilateralism, non-interference, and antiimperialism.112 Although Moscow has failed to demonstrate these political values in its
own neighbourhood, interfering in Georgia and Ukraine, its message has been generally
well received by African publics.113
In the view of some pundits, the excesses and transactional approach of the US and its
allies in international aﬀairs, and the apparent Western decline including the erosion of US
global hegemony, may also contribute to the success of Moscow’s anti-Western public
diplomacy campaign. Russia is seen as an independent, pragmatic and assertive actor
on the continent, a major player that can resist the West, and insist on traditional
values against the liberal inﬂuences of the West. Russia oﬀers an openness to doing
business with all states, irrespective of their government or the standard of democracy,
and as a result is embraced by its targeted audience in Africa.114

Challenges faced by Russian public diplomacy in Africa
Russia does face some challenges in its public diplomacy eﬀorts in Africa. One is the
unfavourable media coverage from the very widely followed Western international
media.115 Western media is accessible in African countries, and through coverage of
world events often spreads negative images of Russia on the continent. The Kremlin
acknowledges this challenge as one of the primary headaches in its public diplomacy
activities in Africa and the globe.116 As foreign publics mainly form their opinions
about a country from what they read in print or see via international digital media, international broadcasting and digital diplomacy are powerful tools in shaping foreign public
opinion about a particular country.
Many Western international media outlets, such as the BBC, CNN, DW, and Sky News, as
well as AFP and Reuters, provide news that is disseminated over African news outlets.117
Although the Kremlin attempts to alleviate this situation, its international broadcasting
channels RT and Sputnik, even with their social media activities, do not have the same
global audience reach as their Western counterparts. In sum, until Moscow can successfully counter the West’s powerful international media’s negative coverage of Russia, its
public diplomacy mechanisms, whether in Africa or on the global stage, will continue
to fall behind its Western rivals in terms of trust and credibility in its nation branding
narrative.
Another challenge for the Kremlin’s public diplomacy on the African continent is its
over-emphasis on traditional public diplomacy models in contrast with the new public
diplomacy. Moscow’s re-engagement with Africa relies heavily on a government-to-government approach through military and economic activities. The traditional public diplomacy model puts the state as the ultimate actor in a country’s attempt to inﬂuence
foreign public opinion, ignoring the role of non-state actors. Bruce Gregory, writing
over a decade ago, distinguished even then between the two models, arguing that the
‘state-based approach’ aiming to exert inﬂuence through foreign public engagement
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was in contrast to the ‘new public diplomacy’ which involved a more comprehensive
range of non-state actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, and supranational
bodies like the EU, AU, and many other international organisations.118 Moscow’s insistence that it control its public diplomacy eﬀorts centrally limits the reach of its public
diplomacy mechanisms; even now the few NGOs and companies that are incorporated
into the public diplomacy drive are mostly state-controlled, whether directly or
indirectly.119 Indeed, Anna Velikaya holds that Russia’s public diplomacy is state-centric
and lacks strategic planning.120
In addition, the Kremlin’s lack of civil society involvement in its public diplomacy in
Africa arguably makes its message less credible. Russia should realise that most soft
power resources reside in a country’s civil society rather than in its government; public
diplomacy messaging from governments is often regarded as propaganda by foreign
publics, and thus, fails to attract.121 Nye believes that a lack of active civil society engagement in public diplomacy makes it challenging to wield soft power because foreign
publics are sceptical about the credibility of top-down government messages.122
Moscow needs to involve more of its civil society in its public diplomacy eﬀorts, and
should give it more leeway to operate if it wants to attract more African publics, especially
those sceptical of the Kremlin’s public diplomacy narrative on the continent. However,
this is not easy to reconcile with the tight state control of its civil society. Simons
claims that Russia has already begun to increase the number of institutions that communicate and engage foreign publics, yet Russia’s global image has not improved.123 The
problem is that foreign publics often see these institutions as Kremlin-sponsored and
thus doubt their trustworthiness and credibility in building a mutually beneﬁcial
relationship.

Implications of Russian public diplomacy in Africa
One of the main implications of the Russian quest for inﬂuence through public diplomacy
engagement on the African continent is the division among African leaders regarding
Russia’s role on the global stage. For instance, due to Russia’s inﬂuence in Africa, many
African leaders chose not to condemn Russia for the war in Ukraine in 2022.124 While
some African countries such as Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria openly condemned Moscow,
others such as South Africa, Egypt and Eritrea – all of whom have somehow beneﬁted
from the Russian public diplomacy agenda, be it through military, economic or other
foreign aid – refused to join the international community in condemning the
Kremlin.125 Steve Gruzd writes, ‘do not expect strident condemnations from those
[African] countries with a large Russian presence’.126 True, historical ties may have
played a role in African states refusing to condemn Russia. Another factor may be a revulsion over the hypocrisy of the West, considering the harm it has caused in Iraq and
Afghanistan following military engagements in those countries.127 There may be
good reasons for being neutral. However, those condemning Russia may also have
good reasons for picking sides. The West or East may inﬂuence an African country’s
decision on such matters. And indeed, each sovereign African state has the right to
decide on international issues based on its understanding and foreign policy.
The vote on a draft UN resolution to condemn Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and to call
on Russia to ‘immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military
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forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’ is a case
in point. This resolution was passed overwhelmingly, with 141 countries favouring it’.128
However, some African states were among the 34 nations that abstained from the vote; 16
African countries abstained, seven did not vote, 25 voted for the resolution, and one
voted against it.129
It is worth mentioning that one of the main strategies of Moscow in Africa is to gain
more alliances to its side. Of 193 states at the UN General Assembly, 54 are African
countries. The UN Security Council reserves three non-permanent seats for Africa.
Russian strategising to gain African support is designed to aﬀect matters at the UN
General Assembly in matters relating to it and its interests. At this point in history,
Russia cannot count on the support of the US and its allies at the UN; hence it has had
to intensify its quest for alliances and inﬂuence in Africa. Russia can also uses its veto
power at the UN Security Council to the beneﬁt of its allies in Africa; African governments
with strained relationships with the West easily succumb to Russia’s oﬀers, including protection from UN sanctions. For example, Russia strongly opposed introducing new sanctions against the interim government in Mali at the UN in January 2022, arguing that ‘we
have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems’.130
Russia’s public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa and its implication go beyond the
continent’s borders. Africa has become a theatre of competing public diplomacy programmes by the US, its allies, China and other emerging economies in Asia. All these
international players may feel the impact of the Kremlin’s public diplomacy toward
Africa. The West, it seems is especially concerned about Russia’s growing presence
on the African continent and its massive campaigns to drive anti-Western rhetoric
and to spread disinformation to undermine democracy on the continent. From
Russia’s disinformation campaign in Libya131 to the Malian publics jubilating in the
streets of Bamako holding high Russian ﬂags and Putin’s photos, Moscow’s disinformation messaging has had eﬀect.

Conclusion
Africa has become a marketplace of competing public diplomacy campaigns by foreign
development partners adopting diﬀerent public diplomacy strategies. While this article
acknowledges the high level of Moscow’s reliance on military and economic activities
in Africa, it sought to examine the Kremlin’s engagement with African publics through
a series of public diplomacy mechanisms. In particular, Russia uses its historical ties, education and health aid programmes, and its international broadcasting (including digital
diplomacy) to exploit and promote anti-Western sentiments on the continent. These
mechanisms are deployed to engage and attract African publics in order to boost its
inﬂuence and soft power on the continent. However, Russian public diplomacy mechanisms in Africa examined in this article demonstrate that the Kremlin’s public diplomacy
remains state-centric and hierarchical, with few or no non-state actors involved. This is an
inherent weakness of Moscow’s public diplomacy in general; it is not surprising that this
shortcoming manifests in its African public engagement campaigns. Since the presidency
through the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs is the sole actor, it mostly involves a top-down
approach, lacking active civil society engagement. As noted by Joseph Nye, such a lack
of active civil society engagement in public diplomacy makes it challenging to wield
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soft power because foreign publics are sceptical about the credibility of top-down government messaging.132
Russia’s international broadcasting mechanism as a relational dimension seems to
have eﬀect in francophone African countries. Moscow has intensiﬁed its activities to
establish RT and Sputnik in many francophone African states, since these networks
were banned in the West due to its invasion of Ukraine. Through these mechanisms,
the Kremlin has contributed to anti-Western sentiments among African publics, particularly in countries where Russia’s presence is strong, like Mali, CAR, Madagascar and
Egypt. It uses social media campaigns through RT and Sputnik to promote this
message, often in the form of disinformation.
The challenges encountering Moscow’s public diplomacy on the continent involve the
negative Western media coverage about Russia in Africa, and Moscow’s over-reliance on
traditional diplomacy, leading to a less active role for civil society. The latter should be
addressed in order to make its message more credible and trustworthy.
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